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yndon Johnson launched a central plank of his Great Society programme in 
1964 with a grand rhetorical ﬂourish. The programmes he proposed were, he 
claimed, a dramatic departure from the past and a moral goal made obtainable 
by the great wealth generated by the engine of growth. ‘As citizens of the 
richest...nation in the history of the world’, Johnson declared in his message to 
Congress, Americans had the duty to declare a ‘war on poverty’.1 
The contention here will be that the War on Poverty arose out of a variety of 
factors. In part, the initiative was the creation of experts in a decade when expertise 
in general was highly esteemed. In part, the programme was typical of Johnson's 
political agenda of personal aggrandisement. But the War on Poverty can perhaps be 
best explained using a combination of public choice, median voter and interest group 
theory. The changing political coalitions and the battle for power between policy-
makers at different levels had much to do with how and why events transpired as 
they did. 
The War on Poverty failed to live up to all of its promises; what was the cause of 
such shortfall? There are many ways to implement an anti-poverty programme and 
the ways chosen reveal a lot about political realities and, perhaps, policy-maker 
intentions. This article will discuss the political and intellectual context of the 
programme, and will look at who gained and who lost from the War on Poverty. 
An Interest Group–Public Choice Model of the Great Society           
The issue of poverty in America began to gain prominence in the early 1960's. 
Kennedy's denunciation of poverty during the 1960 West Virginia primary had 
evoked a positive popular response and indicated nascent public support for anti-
poverty initiatives. The issue began to be taken up by the intellectual community 
with the publication of Michael Harrington's The Other America in 1962 and 
Dwight D. McDonald's 1963 series of New Yorker articles entitled ‘Our Invisible 
Poor’. 
The realisation that growth alone would not lift some groups out of poverty also 
awakened policymakers. A May, 1963 memorandum from Walter Heller, Kennedy's 
head of the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), noted that the decline in the 
number of poor families (those with incomes less than $3000) had been proceeding 
more slowly between 1956 and 1960 than between 1945 and 1955. Kennedy ordered 
an interagency effort to make the case for an anti-poverty programme. The issue was 
pushed forward when 200,000 marchers converged on Washington, making black 
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unemployment one of their civil rights grievances. In November of 1963, Kennedy 
asked to have anti-poverty measures included in the 1964 legislative programme.2 
Kennedy's social programmes were neither daring nor very comprehensive. 
Essentially, the programmes passed under Kennedy were extensions of past policies. 
The 1962 public welfare amendments to the Social Security Act provided federal 
matching funds to help the states provide services to welfare recipients. The social 
welfare lobby, in an extension of previous paternalistic thinking, convinced the 
legislature that these services would somehow get recipients off the rolls.3 
Social welfare payments continued to be tied to need and social programmes in 
general were intended to pay for themselves or at least be cheap. The programmes 
also tended to have constituencies other than the poor. Agricultural lobbies, for 
example, beneﬁted from surplus commodity distribution programmes and from 
Kennedy's limited extension of the programme in the form of food stamps.4 
Johnson's War on Poverty was more dramatic in its presentation but in many 
ways just as conventional. With the signiﬁcant exception of the provision that 
individual communities be given authority to decide how federal funds were spent, 
the rest of the plan—job training, work-study, a call for volunteers, the 
establishment of the Ofﬁce of Economic Opportunity—was a rehash of initiatives 
undertaken by Kennedy and earlier administrations. Poverty-ﬁghting strategies were 
familiar and included therapeutic intervention in the lives of the poor, social 
casework, and skills enhancement through education.5 
The policymakers who sketched out the details of the various planks of the 
initiative were largely technocrats with a fairly narrow focus. Outside consultants 
such as Michael Harrington participated early in the programme but were not very 
inﬂuential.6 The debate over work-force and housing policy was especially technical 
and, in the latter case, the narrow focus has been blamed for the ultimate 
shortcomings of the programme.7 Moreover the Keynesian outlook of Walter Heller 
further limited the scope of the initiatives, in particular keeping New Deal style ‘jobs 
for adults’ programmes off the table. The general notion that tax cuts and the 
resulting prosperity would alleviate most poverty meant that the direct poverty 
reduction policies that resulted would by deﬁnition work at the margins, focusing 
only on the tough cases of deeply structural unemployment and especially 
disadvantaged groups.8 
In part, Johnson wanted to consolidate his support among the general 
electorate with fast and dramatic action.9 He also had a tendency to seek to build 
policy monuments that would ensure his place in history. His leadership style was 
personalistic and authoritarian in numerous policy areas including ﬁscal action and 
defence.10 The War on Poverty, and its overarching framework—The Great Society, 
were leading examples of his desire to be known as a great President. 
The Economic Opportunity Bill sent to the Congress was modest in scale. The 
total budget suggested was $962.5 million, cut down by the Congress to $800 
million, a relatively small percentage of the federal budget. Fifty-eight percent of the 
          39
4 9 t h  P a r a l l e l               I S S U E  2 2  ·  A U T U M N  2 0 0 8  ·  C A M E R O N  G O R D O N  
 
money was earmarked for human capital, youth opportunity and work experience 
programmes. Most of the rest, or about 33%, went for urban and rural community 
action programmes.11 
The remarkable thing about social spending in this era is how little actually was 
directed towards the poor. The EOA programmes grew, but remained relatively 
small. For total social welfare expenditure, which includes housing, health, and 
education spending, only about 17% was speciﬁcally directed towards low-income 
groups. In 1968, these programmes still only accounted for 21% of social welfare 
expenditures. And by 1972, the ﬁgure was only 24%.12 
Of course, overall social welfare expenditure grew rapidly between 1965 and 
1972, from 39% to 46% of public outlays at all levels of government. Means-tested 
programmes grew equally quickly. But in each of those years, the pre-transfer 
poverty population received slightly less than 40% of total expenditures, and about 
60% of this went to the elderly and the disabled poor, where increasing transfers met 
little opposition. It should be noted, though, that the poor did receive more of 
Federal social welfare expenditures (roughly 50%) than they did of State and local 
expenditures (roughly 28–30%).13 
If the poor received relatively little of the growing social welfare expenditures 
under Johnson, who did get the money? Therein lies an interesting tale, for many of 
the programmes that were initiated were strongly inﬂuenced by interest groups and 
those that grew most strongly were those that had the most powerful groups 
backing them. Those with weak support tended either to wither or to change in 
ways favourable to certain constituencies. 
Health-care spending is an outstanding example. The main programmes, Title 
18 of the Social Security Act, which provided Medicare for the aged, and Title 19, 
which set up Medicaid for the poor, were schemes of public ﬁnancing of private 
health-care for certain targeted groups. Wilbur Mills, chairman of the House Ways 
and Means Committee, had helped put together the programme as a way of 
preserving hospitalisation beneﬁts favourable to the American Hospital Association 
while placating the American Medical Association, which opposed mandatory 
coverage of physician fees by health insurance (the section of Medicare covering 
physician's services is largely voluntary).14 
Medicare and Medicaid were both essentially cost-plus ﬁnancing schemes for 
private health-care. After institution of the programmes, health costs began a long 
and sustained rise above the rate of inﬂation.15 Partly because of this increase, 
expenditures on the programmes grew rapidly from the programme’s inception to 
$7.5 billion for Medicare and $3 billion for Medicaid in 1970.16 
Other health programmes of the War on Poverty did not fare as well over time. 
The Regional Medical Programs (RMP's) survived but were only modestly 
successful. These ‘regional centres of excellence’, which were designed to encourage 
cooperation between local health-care institutions to ﬁght speciﬁc health problems, 
were supported by the medical education and research community and usually ended 
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up being led by a hospital prominent in a particular region. This modest 
institutional support probably accounted for its survival.17 
By contrast, the Neighbourhood Health Centres of the OEO and the modest 
family planning effort associated with it did not survive the Nixon years. These 
programmes, directed towards poor inner-city neighbourhoods, never grew that 
large. The Health Centres, which were supposed to provide the poor with 
comprehensive health-care, peaked with a budget of $130 million in 1972 before 
being phased out.  
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare's (HEW) Maternal and Child 
Health Programs suffered a similar fate. Even though the effort signiﬁcantly reduced 
infant mortality rates in the poor areas where it was implemented, and even though 
the improvement may have been signiﬁcant enough to register in national infant 
mortality statistics, the programmes, after some modest growth, began to be scaled 
back in 1973.18 
The politics of War on Poverty health-care initiatives seemed to favour the 
better-organised, better-ﬁnanced groups. The poor, who were supposed to beneﬁt 
from the programmes, saw those most targeted to them cut down. The largest 
health-care programme, Medicare, served the large and well-organised constituency 
of the elderly. Even Medicaid, which did largely serve the indigent, also gave 
signiﬁcant opportunities to health-care providers to enrich themselves by raising 
fees. 
Housing programmes were embedded with similar politics. The 1964 Housing 
and Urban Development Act pulled together several programmes into the new 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).19 Most of these pre-
existing programmes were tax and mortgage subsidies for owner-occupied housing, 
which beneﬁted the upper half of the income distribution, or federally ﬁnanced 
highway construction and urban renewal programmes that stimulated suburban 
growth and displaced inner-city indigents.20 
 Additional housing programmes that were part of the Act or that were added in 
1965 were targeted to the poor but remained relatively small. One programme 
provided subsidies to local authorities to lease privately owned units for families to 
rent as public housing. Only 92,000 units of housing were operated under the plan 
by 1972 and most of this was concentrated in poor neighbourhoods. The 1965 
federal rent supplement programme had the federal government pay the difference 
between market rents and 25% of the tenant's adjusted income. Much of the housing 
ended up being in completely rent-supplemented projects and few of the eligible 
families ended up receiving beneﬁts since the programme was not universally 
available.21 
The riots that swept the country after 1965 led to a whirlwind of study of 
housing problems including the formation of two federal commissions—the 
National Committee on Urban Problems in 1967 and the President's Committee on 
Urban Housing. The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 set a housing 
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production target of 26 million additional new and rehabilitated units to be built 
between 1968 and 1978, including six million units available to low-income and 
moderate-income households.22 
However, this initiative did not beneﬁt the poorest. Section 236 of the Act 
provided subsidies to lenders so that interest on privately-owned, low-income rental 
projects could be reduced to 1% in the hope that landlords would pass on the 
interest savings to tenants in the form of lower rents. The direct subsidy was to the 
landlord, not the household! Section 235 was a programme for homeowners that 
provided interest subsidies, reduced mortgage costs and ‘low down’ payments. 
Homeowners were not likely to be among the poorest in the society. The 1971 
household median income of participants in the Section 236 programmes was $5000 
and of those in the Section 235 programmes, only 5% had incomes less than 
$4000.23 
Some of the most prominent Great Society programmes involved education and 
work-force and employment programmes. Education expenditures for the poor were 
modest. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 was meant ‘to 
provide ﬁnancial assistance to local educational agencies serving areas with 
concentrations of children from low-income families’. The amount appropriated in 
the ﬁrst year was less than $1 billion and in later years this increased to $1.5 billion. 
The initial expenditure amounted to about 4% of total annual school expenditure at 
all levels of government and equalled, perhaps, a supplement of about $150 per 
pupil.24  
Head Start was a programme with a similar constituency. Designed to narrow 
the education gap between disadvantaged and median income youth, the highly 
decentralised programme took many different forms depending on the locality. The 
programme ended up being cut back from $652 million in 1968–69 to $369 million 
in 1971–72.25 
Most education spending also did not accrue to the poor. The programmes of 
the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963 provided federal grants and loans for 
college construction.26 Between 1965 and 1972, never more than 19% of total federal 
education expenditures went to the pre-transfer poor.27 
There were a variety of work-force and employment programmes, including the 
Job Corps which provided training and activities for male school dropouts; the 
Neighbourhood Youth Corps (NYC) which provided jobs and schooling for a similar 
population; and the Work Experience Program, which was designed for those on 
welfare. The Work Incentive Program (WIN) and the Manpower Development and 
Training Act of 1962 (MDTA) were two signiﬁcant, non OEO-funded employment 
programmes.28 These programmes did mainly serve impoverished groups but they 
remained highly controversial and relatively small. From less than 1% of total social 
welfare expenditures on the state and local level in 1965, these programmes only 
grew to account for 2% by 1972.29 However it should be noted that by that point a 
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new, and ideologically different, Federal administration was in power and that 
certainly accounts for some of the limitations. 
Finally there are relief and public assistance expenditures and the ill-fated 
Community Assistance Program. Relief programmes are, by nature, directed 
towards the poor and, indeed, the poor beneﬁted from programmes such as AFDC, 
Food Stamps and Medicaid. 
However, the politics of relief programmes are not so straightforward. The 
method of relief often provided gains to non-poor groups in helping indigents. 
Medicaid is one such example where private care providers were perhaps 
overcompensated for helping the poor. Food stamps and surplus commodity 
distribution were similarly designed to reduce the government's food stocks and to 
aid farm-price supports. Partly because of this and partly because of the wide 
constituency food stamps have developed, the food stamps system has been one pro-
poor programme that has ﬂourished.30 Those programmes without such support did 
not do as well. 
The particulars of the War on Poverty were certainly paternalistic. What were 
its deeper motivations? Was, for example, the Great Society intended mainly as a 
way of quieting unrest and disciplining poor blacks as authors such as Piven and 
Cloward maintain?31 The evidence seems to suggest otherwise. Despite the civil 
rights disturbances, there was relatively little civil unrest in the cities at the time of 
the programme's launching and policy deliberations seemed little affected by such a 
prospect. The ﬁrst major civil disorder of the 1960's took place in Los Angeles in 
August of 1965, well after the passage of the Economic Opportunity Act.32 
Moreover, civil unrest and mobilisation of the poor did not necessarily lead to 
increased welfare spending. While the Great Society was born in the absence of 
rioting, the surge in unrest from 1965 to 1968 was part of the reason that 
restrictions were imposed on AFDC in 1967 and 1968. Also, the explosion of the 
rolls made AFDC cost more than politicians were willing to pay.33 
It is also deﬁnitely the case that there was a signiﬁcant component of the War 
on Poverty that focused on providing expanded opportunities to the poor rather 
than guaranteed outcomes. Indeed the ﬁrst director of the Ofﬁce of Economic 
Opportunity (OEO), Sargent Shriver, said ‘opportunity is our middle name’ and ‘we 
don’t give handouts’.34 In this sense, poverty outcomes cannot be seen as a complete 
measure of programme success since not all who are given expanded opportunities 
will necessarily succeed. However, it is perhaps even more difﬁcult to measure 
increases in opportunity. 
The Community Action Program (CAP) illustrates many of these 
crosscurrents. The basic thrust of the CAP was to provide the disempowered a 
channel to challenge the overall political system, but a channel that was enshrined 
within the existing political system. Using an interest group framework, the failure 
of the programme is perhaps not surprising since the programme pitted relatively 
weak groups against strong and entrenched ones. But the really interesting fact is 
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that CAP did not actually die in many respects, but was transformed by the very 
interests that opposed it. 
Certainly the incumbent Democrats had a motive for bypassing hostile local 
governments and agencies. However, the idea did have some intellectual precedent. 
Indeed, the contradictory notion that the system can be overthrown by use of the 
system is enshrined in the Declaration of Independence. And the idea that a change 
in the channels of power can lead to a change in the distribution of power itself is an 
idea going back to the 19th century.35 Thus, while there is no doubt some self-
interest behind CAP, the idea has deep and respected roots in American political 
thought. 
Moreover, CAP is best seen as a step in the continuing shift in power from the 
state and local level to the federal government. In this case, the parties 
compromised: the national administration bought off the local elites by scrapping 
the new channels of power and giving more resources in return for allowing the 
implementation of various national programmes. 
CAP was quite unpopular when ﬁrst enacted. Big city politicians felt the 
programme to be an invasion of their prerogatives. Chicago mayor Richard Daley 
said that letting poor people run anti-poverty programmes would be ‘like telling the 
fellow who cleans up to be the city editor of a newspaper’. In June of 1965, 
Democrats John Shelley, Mayor of San Francisco, and Sam Yorty, Mayor of Los 
Angeles, offered a resolution to the U.S. Conference of Mayors accusing the OEO of 
‘fostering class struggle’. Social workers meanwhile resisted the notion that the poor 
could take care of themselves. ‘You can't go to a street corner with a pad and a pencil 
and tell the poor to write an antipoverty program. They wouldn't know how’, said 
one member of New York City's anti-poverty board.36 
Congress began to suspect that CAP had helped foment the wave of riots in 
1965, although the evidence for this has turned out to be slight.37 By the Summer of 
1966, the OEO bill emerged from the House Ways and Means Committee with 
speciﬁc amounts earmarked for less controversial national programmes rather than 
leaving budgetary decisions to local CAP agencies. In the same year, an alternative 
approach to community revitalisation was provided in the Model Cities programme 
that stressed physical environment and gave control to City Hall. In 1967, 
Congresswoman Edith Green, responding to local mayors' complaints, successfully 
passed an amendment enabling local governments to sponsor CAP agencies.38 
While local control passed from weak constituencies (the poor and community 
activists) to stronger constituencies (local politicians and professional social 
workers) the federal government continued to give money to localities with 
increasing requirements attached but with incentives softening the blow. Before 
1964, federal grants to states and localities were heavily concentrated in highways, 
public assistance and traditional local public services. The War on Poverty, by 
contrast, vastly expanded the number of grant areas and objectives. CAP can be seen 
as a failed attempt to bludgeon the localities into implementation of federal goals; the 
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lowering or elimination of matching funds the recipient was required to contribute 
was a more successful bribe to local governments, which accomplished the desired 
result with different means.39 
Conclusion and Postscript 
The War on Poverty and its successors can be accounted for by public choice and 
interest group models. The politically powerful interest groups that one might 
expect to beneﬁt, did beneﬁt in the end; the weaker groups did not, in general, do as 
well. Robert Haveman has estimated that the poor beneﬁted overall from the Great 
Society and related social welfare expenditures. However, the non-poor beneﬁted 
from these expenditures enough so that the cost to them was less than the growth 
of personal income in 1980.40 
Haveman's results are interesting in that they may help explain how the War on 
Poverty got off the ground in the ﬁrst place. The programmes provided beneﬁts to 
all in the form of things like a ‘safety net’, which acted as a hedge against uncertainty. 
At the same time, the initiatives that were targeted to the poor, when subtracted 
from beneﬁts, were cheap enough not to generate general opposition. Once 
implemented, many groups did quite well under the growing welfare state and 
became advocates for speciﬁc initiatives.   
On a ﬁnal note, there is still some debate about whether the War on Poverty 
was actually ‘won’ or not. Traditional measures of poverty based on income suggest 
that the answer is ‘no’. Poverty levels did fall during the War on Poverty to a 
minimum of 11.1% in 1973. However they then rebounded after that when new, and 
less poverty reduction oriented, policies took hold. However, taking household 
consumption into account, there were more substantial reductions in poverty and 
these were sustained after the programme was ended.41 This is a larger debate. This 
paper has sought to demonstrate nonetheless that many non-poor groups beneﬁted 
from the programme and had a hand in re-shaping it to accomplish such a shift. 
 

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